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naibaandcloudcode
e8dabf5bc6
Introduce Personal Access Tokens (nzp_*) as a stateless auth path alongside
JWT, gated per-endpoint by a scope middleware (nezha:{resource}:{verb}) with
fail-closed empty-scope defaults and a server-id whitelist. Self-management
endpoints (profile, api-tokens, oauth2 bind, refresh-token) explicitly reject
PATs to block privilege-escalation chains. A revoke registry tears down active
long-lived connections (terminal, fm, ws, transfer, mcp) the moment a PAT is
deleted, with a tombstone closing the revoke->register race.
Add an MCP endpoint that proxies tool calls (exec, fs read/write/delete,
transfer) to agents over gRPC, guarded by origin/DNS-rebinding checks, a
per-token rate limiter, audit logging, and a kill switch. Serialize all
sends through the IOStream wrapper to honour grpc-go's concurrency contract.
Add CSRF double-submit protection on unsafe cookie-authenticated methods,
exempting authenticated PAT requests by context identity (not a forgeable
Authorization header). Apply visibility/whitelist filtering consistently
across list, get-by-id, and mutate paths to enforce tenant isolation.
Migrate legacy mcp:* scopes: rewrite read/exec to nezha:* equivalents and
drop dangerous write/delete/wildcard grants.
Co-authored-by: cloudcode <cloudcode@users.noreply.github.com>
92 lines
3.3 KiB
Go
92 lines
3.3 KiB
Go
package controller
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"testing"
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"time"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
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"google.golang.org/grpc/metadata"
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"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/model"
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pb "github.com/nezhahq/nezha/proto"
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"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/service/rpc"
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"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/service/singleton"
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)
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// execErrorStream replies every Task with a TaskResult whose Successful=true
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// but whose Data carries a model.ExecResult{Error: ...}. This is exactly what
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// the real agent does for "agent disabled command execution" / "cmd required"
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// / pre-start failures.
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type execErrorStream struct {
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errMsg string
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}
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func (s *execErrorStream) Send(t *pb.Task) error {
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go func(taskID uint64) {
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b, _ := json.Marshal(model.ExecResult{ExitCode: -1, Error: s.errMsg})
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rpc.DeliverMCPResultForTest(&pb.TaskResult{
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Id: taskID,
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Type: model.TaskTypeExec,
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Successful: true,
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Data: string(b),
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})
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}(t.GetId())
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return nil
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}
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func (s *execErrorStream) Recv() (*pb.TaskResult, error) { return nil, context.Canceled }
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func (s *execErrorStream) SetHeader(metadata.MD) error { return nil }
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func (s *execErrorStream) SendHeader(metadata.MD) error { return nil }
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func (s *execErrorStream) SetTrailer(metadata.MD) {}
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func (s *execErrorStream) Context() context.Context { return context.Background() }
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func (s *execErrorStream) SendMsg(any) error { return nil }
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func (s *execErrorStream) RecvMsg(any) error { return context.Canceled }
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// TestServerExec_AgentReportedErrorBecomesToolError pins the protocol contract
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// that fs.* tools already obey: when the agent returns a structured result
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// with a non-empty Error field, MCP tools/call must surface isError=true and
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// audit must record agent_error — not MCPOutcomeOK with a quietly-failed
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// structuredContent. The previous handler ignored ExecResult.Error and
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// returned res, nil, which made the LLM and the audit log both believe the
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// command succeeded while the agent had actually refused it.
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func TestServerExec_AgentReportedErrorBecomesToolError(t *testing.T) {
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cleanup, uid := setupMCPTest(t)
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defer cleanup()
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srv, _ := singleton.ServerShared.Get(7)
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srv.SetTaskStream(&execErrorStream{errMsg: "agent disabled command execution"})
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tok, _ := mkToken(t, uid, []string{model.ScopeServerExec}, nil)
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c, w := mcpCallCtx(t, tok, uid, jsonRPCRequest{
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JSONRPC: "2.0", ID: json.RawMessage("1"), Method: "tools/call",
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Params: jsonObj(t, toolCallParams{
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Name: "server.exec",
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Arguments: jsonRaw(map[string]any{
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"server_id": 7,
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"cmd": "echo",
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"timeout_seconds": 2,
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}),
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}),
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})
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mcpEndpoint(c)
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_, tcr := decodeRPC(w)
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require.NotNil(t, tcr, "tools/call must return a tool result envelope")
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require.True(t, tcr.IsError,
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"agent ExecResult.Error must propagate as MCP tool error; got %+v", tcr)
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require.Contains(t, tcr.Content[0].Text, "agent disabled command execution",
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"tool error text must surface the agent-reported error message")
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require.Eventually(t, func() bool {
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var got model.MCPAuditLog
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err := singleton.DB.Where("token_id = ?", tok.ID).First(&got).Error
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if err != nil {
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return false
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}
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return got.Outcome == model.MCPOutcomeAgentError
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}, 2*time.Second, 20*time.Millisecond,
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"audit row must record agent_error, not ok, when ExecResult.Error is set")
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}
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