diff --git a/docker/.env b/docker/.env
index 532f35706f..d33ff98f99 100644
--- a/docker/.env
+++ b/docker/.env
@@ -307,8 +307,9 @@ ADMIN_DEFAULT_PASSWORD=admin
 
 # Development-only: set to 1 to allow private database and connector hosts
 # (MySQL, PostgreSQL, IMAP, test_db_connection, ExeSQL), including
-# host.docker.internal. The dial stays pinned to the resolved address.
-# Agent URL and Invoke checks stay in force. Do not enable in production.
+# host.docker.internal, and HTTP request (Invoke) target and proxy URLs.
+# Dials stay pinned to the resolved address; HTTP/HTTPS validation still applies.
+# Other Agent URL checks stay in force. Do not enable in production.
 ALLOW_ANY_HOST=0
 
 # The RAGFlow Docker image to download. v0.22+ doesn't include embedding models.
diff --git a/internal/agent/component/invoke.go b/internal/agent/component/invoke.go
index 5ded3578b1..df3c0bb38a 100644
--- a/internal/agent/component/invoke.go
+++ b/internal/agent/component/invoke.go
@@ -24,12 +24,13 @@
 // traceparent headers.
 //
 // SSRF guard (PR #15426): every outbound URL is validated against
-// the shared common.AssertURLSafe before any network I/O. Both the
-// target URL and an optional proxy URL are checked — the proxy
+// the shared common.AssertURLSafe before any network I/O, unless
+// ALLOW_ANY_HOST permits private hosts. Both the target URL and
+// an optional proxy URL are checked — the proxy
 // vector matters because the Go transport hands the request to the
 // proxy host, which would otherwise re-resolve the original host
 // and re-open the rebinding window the SSRF guard just closed. To
-// defeat DNS rebinding the transport dials the validated public IP
+// defeat DNS rebinding the transport dials the validated IP
 // directly (utility.PinnedHTTPClient) and we disable redirect
 // following so a 30x to a private host cannot bypass the guard.
 package component
@@ -93,12 +94,12 @@ func (i *InvokeComponent) Name() string { return i.name }
 // param
 //
 // SSRF flow (PR #15426):
-//  1. Validate the target URL via common.AssertURLSafe (loopback /
-//     link-local / RFC1918 / metadata / unresolvable are rejected).
+//  1. Validate the target URL (private addresses are rejected unless
+//     ALLOW_ANY_HOST is enabled; scheme and DNS checks always apply).
 //  2. Validate the optional proxy URL the same way (the proxy
 //     re-resolves the target host; an unsafe proxy would defeat
 //     step 1).
-//  3. Use utility.PinnedHTTPClient to dial the validated public IP
+//  3. Use utility.PinnedHTTPClient to dial the validated IP
 //     for the target host — closing the TOCTOU window between
 //     validation and connect.
 //  4. Disable redirect following so a 30x to a private host cannot
@@ -140,8 +141,8 @@ func (i *InvokeComponent) Invoke(ctx context.Context, db *gorm.DB, inputs map[st
 	}
 
 	// Step 1: SSRF guard for the target URL. The validated
-	// hostname + resolved public IP are reused for DNS pinning.
-	host, pinnedIP, err := common.AssertURLSafe(rawURL)
+	// hostname + resolved IP are reused for DNS pinning.
+	host, pinnedIP, err := validateInvokeURL(rawURL)
 	if err != nil {
 		return invokeSSRFError("url", rawURL, err), nil
 	}
@@ -180,7 +181,7 @@ func (i *InvokeComponent) Invoke(ctx context.Context, db *gorm.DB, inputs map[st
 			return invokeSSRFError("url", rawURL,
 				fmt.Errorf("Invoke: proxy mode requires a literal-IP target URL (hostnames are unsafe because the proxy re-resolves them)")), nil
 		}
-		ph, pip, perr := common.AssertURLSafe(proxyStr)
+		ph, pip, perr := validateInvokeURL(proxyStr)
 		if perr != nil {
 			return invokeSSRFError("proxy", proxyStr, perr), nil
 		}
@@ -247,7 +248,7 @@ func (i *InvokeComponent) Invoke(ctx context.Context, db *gorm.DB, inputs map[st
 				DialContext: func(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
 					// When the transport dials the proxy, addr is
 					// "<proxy_host>:<proxy_port>". Replace the
-					// host with the validated public IP while
+					// host with the validated IP while
 					// keeping the original port. Any other dial
 					// (e.g. a redirect hop the no-redirect policy
 					// would have blocked) falls through to the
@@ -266,7 +267,7 @@ func (i *InvokeComponent) Invoke(ctx context.Context, db *gorm.DB, inputs map[st
 			CheckRedirect: noRedirects,
 		}
 	} else {
-		// Direct path: pin to the validated public IP, disable
+		// Direct path: pin to the validated IP, disable
 		// redirects, and apply the OTel transport. PinnedHTTPClient
 		// sets its own timeout; we re-wrap with otelhttp so the
 		// request gets a child span + W3C traceparent injected.
@@ -379,6 +380,22 @@ func invokeHeaders(raw any) (map[string]any, error) {
 	return headers, nil
 }
 
+func validateInvokeURL(rawURL string) (hostname, resolvedIP string, err error) {
+	if !common.AllowConfiguredPrivateHost() {
+		return common.AssertURLSafe(rawURL)
+	}
+	if err := common.AssertURLSchemeSafe(rawURL); err != nil {
+		return "", "", err
+	}
+	parsed, err := url.Parse(strings.TrimSpace(rawURL))
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", "", err
+	}
+	hostname = parsed.Hostname()
+	resolvedIP, err = common.ResolveHostPin(hostname)
+	return hostname, resolvedIP, err
+}
+
 // invokeSSRFError builds the _ERROR output the canvas uses to route
 // around a refused URL. We mirror the Python message verbatim
 // ("URL not valid") so downstream consumers that key on the string
diff --git a/internal/agent/component/invoke_test.go b/internal/agent/component/invoke_test.go
index 3735a11715..f759ff7c6f 100644
--- a/internal/agent/component/invoke_test.go
+++ b/internal/agent/component/invoke_test.go
@@ -34,19 +34,11 @@ import (
 	"go.uber.org/zap/zaptest/observer"
 )
 
-// Test setup: enable the test-only SSRF bypass for tests in this
-// file (the happy-path httptest server lives on 127.0.0.1, which
-// the production guard rejects). The bypass is now a process-
-// memory boolean (common.AllowAnyHostForTest) instead of an
-// env var — the previous form (ALLOW_ANY_HOST env) was a live
-// runtime toggle any operator could flip to disable the guard
-// globally. PR review round 6, Major #3.
-//
-// Each test that wants the production guard back resets it to
-// false in its body; we don't blanket-disable here because some
-// tests below rely on the bypass being on.
+// Reset the environment opt-in so tests select private-host access explicitly
+// through either ALLOW_ANY_HOST or the in-memory test hook.
 func setupAllowAnyHost(t *testing.T, enabled bool) {
 	t.Helper()
+	t.Setenv(common.EnvAllowAnyHost, "")
 	prev := common.AllowAnyHostForTest
 	common.AllowAnyHostForTest = enabled
 	t.Cleanup(func() { common.AllowAnyHostForTest = prev })
@@ -254,6 +246,85 @@ func TestInvoke_MissingURL(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestInvoke_AllowAnyHost(t *testing.T) {
+	setupAllowAnyHost(t, false)
+
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		if !strings.HasPrefix(r.Host, "local.test.invalid:") || r.URL.Path != "/logo.svg" {
+			t.Errorf("request = %s%s, want local.test.invalid:<port>/logo.svg", r.Host, r.URL.Path)
+		}
+		_, _ = w.Write([]byte("local response"))
+	}))
+	defer srv.Close()
+	_, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(strings.TrimPrefix(srv.URL, "http://"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	originalLookup := common.LookupHost
+	common.LookupHost = func(host string) ([]string, error) {
+		if host != "local.test.invalid" {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected hostname %q", host)
+		}
+		return []string{"127.0.0.1"}, nil
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { common.LookupHost = originalLookup })
+
+	for _, value := range []string{"", "0", "1"} {
+		t.Run("ALLOW_ANY_HOST="+value, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Setenv(common.EnvAllowAnyHost, value)
+			c, err := NewInvokeComponent(nil)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			out, err := c.Invoke(t.Context(), nil, map[string]any{
+				"method": "GET",
+				"url":    "http://local.test.invalid:" + port + "/logo.svg",
+			})
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("Invoke: %v", err)
+			}
+			if value == "1" {
+				if out["result"] != "local response" || out["_ERROR"] != nil {
+					t.Fatalf("output = %#v, want local response", out)
+				}
+			} else if out["_ERROR"] != "URL not valid" || out["result"] != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("output = %#v, want blocked URL", out)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestInvoke_AllowAnyHostRejectsInvalidURLs(t *testing.T) {
+	setupAllowAnyHost(t, false)
+	t.Setenv(common.EnvAllowAnyHost, "1")
+	originalLookup := common.LookupHost
+	common.LookupHost = func(host string) ([]string, error) {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("no such host: %s", host)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { common.LookupHost = originalLookup })
+
+	for _, kind := range []string{"url", "proxy"} {
+		for _, target := range []string{"file://127.0.0.1/logo.svg", "http:///logo.svg", "http://missing.test.invalid/logo.svg"} {
+			t.Run(kind+"/"+target, func(t *testing.T) {
+				c, err := NewInvokeComponent(nil)
+				if err != nil {
+					t.Fatal(err)
+				}
+				inputs := map[string]any{"method": "GET", "url": "http://192.168.1.5/logo.svg"}
+				inputs[kind] = target
+				out, err := c.Invoke(t.Context(), nil, inputs)
+				if err != nil {
+					t.Fatalf("Invoke: %v", err)
+				}
+				if out["_ERROR"] != "URL not valid" || out["result"] != nil {
+					t.Fatalf("output = %#v, want blocked URL", out)
+				}
+			})
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 // TestInvoke_SSRFGuard_BlocksLoopback mirrors PR #15426: when
 // AllowAnyHostForTest is unset (production shape), the Invoke
 // component must reject loopback / link-local / RFC1918 URLs
@@ -360,8 +431,8 @@ func TestInvoke_SSRFGuard_BlocksProxy(t *testing.T) {
 // not followed. This closes the bypass window where a public
 // host could 302-redirect to a private one.
 func TestInvoke_NoRedirects_NotFollowed(t *testing.T) {
-	// Need the bypass to talk to the local httptest server.
-	setupAllowAnyHost(t, true)
+	setupAllowAnyHost(t, false)
+	t.Setenv(common.EnvAllowAnyHost, "1")
 
 	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		w.Header().Set("Location", "http://127.0.0.1:1/secret")
@@ -402,9 +473,8 @@ func TestInvoke_NoRedirects_NotFollowed(t *testing.T) {
 // proxy URL itself is unreachable on the test network, so
 // the dial will fail — but with an error that mentions
 // the IP we dialled, not the original hostname. That
-// proves the pinning path is active. We un-set
-// ALLOW_ANY_HOST so the SSRF guard accepts a public-IP
-// URL but the dial still happens through our code path.
+// proves the pinning path is active. ALLOW_ANY_HOST permits
+// the local proxy while the dial stays pinned.
 //
 // Target host is a literal IP (8.8.8.8) — proxy mode
 // fail-closes for hostname targets because the proxy
@@ -412,7 +482,8 @@ func TestInvoke_NoRedirects_NotFollowed(t *testing.T) {
 // would re-open the rebinding window. PR review round 5,
 // Major #3.
 func TestInvoke_ProxyDNSPin(t *testing.T) {
-	setupAllowAnyHost(t, true)
+	setupAllowAnyHost(t, false)
+	t.Setenv(common.EnvAllowAnyHost, "1")
 
 	proxyHit := make(chan struct{}, 1)
 	proxySrv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
diff --git a/internal/common/allow_private_host.go b/internal/common/allow_private_host.go
index 5106187559..d683db2bb7 100644
--- a/internal/common/allow_private_host.go
+++ b/internal/common/allow_private_host.go
@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ import (
 // The flag is the development opt-in documented in docker/.env. It applies
 // to host-based database and connector dials (MySQL, PostgreSQL, IMAP,
 // test_db_connection, ExeSQL), including host.docker.internal, and configured
-// MCP servers. Other URL and Invoke guards do not call this. DNS pinning
-// remains enabled. Default is off.
+// MCP servers, and Invoke target and proxy URLs. Other URL guards do not
+// call this. DNS pinning remains enabled. Default is off.
 func AllowConfiguredPrivateHost() bool {
 	switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(GetEnv(EnvAllowAnyHost))) {
 	case "1", "true", "yes", "on":
diff --git a/internal/common/http.go b/internal/common/http.go
index bb1990b708..3d40bfa19d 100644
--- a/internal/common/http.go
+++ b/internal/common/http.go
@@ -477,17 +477,9 @@ var LookupHost = net.LookupHost
 // talk to a local httptest server flip it on and reset it in
 // t.Cleanup.
 //
-// The previous form (env-var ALLOW_ANY_HOST) was a live runtime
-// toggle that any operator could flip to disable the SSRF guard
-// globally — including the DNS pinning that the Invoke component
-// relies on. PR review round 6, Major #3: this variable lives in
-// process memory only, so it cannot be enabled by an env var or
-// a deployment mistake. The explicit "_ForTest" suffix is the
-// signal that production code must never touch it.
-//
-// Host-based database and connector dials and configured MCP servers are a
-// separate opt-in. AllowConfiguredPrivateHost reads ALLOW_ANY_HOST for those
-// dials only. This function stays limited to the in-memory test hook.
+// Host-based database and connector dials, configured MCP servers, and Invoke
+// URLs have a separate ALLOW_ANY_HOST opt-in via AllowConfiguredPrivateHost.
+// AssertURLSafe and AssertHostSafe stay limited to the in-memory test hook.
 var AllowAnyHostForTest = false
 
 // allowAnyHost reads the test-only override. Kept as a private
@@ -500,8 +492,8 @@ func allowAnyHost() bool {
 // AssertURLSchemeSafe is a lenient SSRF guard for drivers that may legitimately
 // target private networks or loopback addresses (e.g. self-hosted Ollama, vLLM,
 // Xinference). It only rejects dangerous schemes and empty hosts; it does not
-// resolve DNS and does not require public routability. Use this ONLY for
-// local-inference model drivers — cloud-hosted drivers must use AssertURLSafe.
+// resolve DNS and does not require public routability. Use this only where
+// private hosts are explicitly permitted; cloud-hosted drivers must use AssertURLSafe.
 var AssertURLSchemeSafe = func(rawURL string) error {
 	parsed, err := url.Parse(strings.TrimSpace(rawURL))
 	if err != nil {